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a b s t r a c t
This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral
and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework
combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic
feature is that it relies only on objectively observable market data and does not use hidden individual
agents’ characteristics (such as their utilities and beliefs). A central goal of the study is to identify an
investment strategy that allows an investor to survive in the market selection process, i.e., to keep with
probability one a strictly positive, bounded away from zero share of market wealth over an infinite
time horizon, irrespective of the strategies used by the other players. The main results show that under
very general assumptions, such a strategy exists, is asymptotically unique and easily computable.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
We develop a new dynamic stochastic equilibriummodel of an
asset market combining evolutionary and behavioral approaches.
The classical financial DSGE theory going back to Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Radner (1972, 1982) (see Magill and Quinzii,
1996) relies upon the hypothesis of full rationality of market play-
ers, who are assumed to maximize their utilities or preferences
subject to budget constraints, i.e., solve well-defined and pre-
cisely stated constrained optimization problems. The model we
consider relaxes these assumptions and permits traders/investors
to have a whole variety of patterns of behavior determined by
their individual psychology, not necessarily describable in terms
of utility maximization. Strategies may involve, for example,
mimicking, satisficing, rules of thumb based on experience, etc.
Strategies might be interactive—depending on the behavior of the
others. Objectives might be of an evolutionary nature: survival
(especially in crisis environments), domination in a market seg-
ment, fastest capital growth, etc. They might be relative—taking
into account the performance of the others.
✩ Results of this research were presented at the 1st (July 2017), 2nd (De-
cember 2017) and 3rd (September 2019) Manchester conferences ‘‘Mathematical
Economics and Finance". We are grateful to participants of these conferences,
especially to Rabah Amir, Sergei Belkov, Jiulio Bottazzi, Daniele Giachini, László
Györfi, Alex Possajennikov, Huang Weihong, Le Xu, Nicholas Yannelis and
Mikhail Zhitlukhin for helpful comments. Special thanks are due to Esmaeil
Babaei, Yuri Kifer, and Sergey Pirogov for useful discussions on topics in the
theory of random dynamical systems related to this work.
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Banking and Finance, University of
Zurich, and Swiss Finance Institute, Zurich, Switzerland.
E-mail address: Thorsten.Hens@bf.uzh.ch (T. Hens).
Models considered in this field – they are referred to as ‘‘EBF’’
(Evolutionary Behavioral Finance) models – combine elements of
the theory of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game
theory. The former offers the general notion of a strategy and
the latter suggests the game solution concept: a survival strategy.
In EBF frameworks, the process of market dynamics is described
as a sequence of consecutive short-run equilibria determining
equilibrium asset prices over each time period. The notion of
a short-run price equilibrium is defined directly via the set of
strategies of the market players specifying the patterns of their
investment behavior (behavioral equilibrium).
The main focus of EBF is on investment strategies that survive
in the market selection process, i.e., guarantee with probability
one a positive, bounded away from zero share of market wealth
over an infinite time horizon. Typical results show that such
strategies exist, are asymptotically unique and easily computable.
The computations do not require, in contrast with the classical
DSGE, the knowledge of hidden agents’ characteristics such as
individual utilities and beliefs.
Fundamental contributions to the evolutionary modeling of
financial markets were made in Anderson et al. (1988), Arthur
et al. (1997), Blume and Easley (1992), Bottazzi et al. (2018,
2005), Bottazzi and Dindo (2013a,b), Brock et al. (2005), Coury
and Sciubba (2012), Farmer (2002), Farmer and Lo (1999), Lo
(2004, 2005, 2012, 2017), Lo et al. (2018), Sciubba (2005, 2006),
and Zhang et al. (2014).
Financial DSGE models integrating evolutionary and behav-
ioral approaches were proposed in Amir et al. (2011) and Amir
et al. (2013). A survey describing the state of the art in EBF by
2016 and outlining a program for further research was given
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.004
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in Evstigneev et al. (2016). An elementary textbook treatment of
the subject can be found in Evstigneev et al. (2015), Ch. 20. For a
most recent review of the development of studies related to this
area see Holtfort (2019). General perspectives of a synthesis of
behavioral and mainstream economics based on the evolutionary
approach are discussed in a recent paper by Aumann (2019).
EBF models invoke ideas related to behavioral economics and
finance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Shiller, 2003; Bachmann
et al., 2018), evolutionary game theory (Weibull, 1995; Samuel-
son, 1997; Gintis, 2009; Kojima, 2006) and games of survival
(Milnor and Shapley, 1957; Shubik and Thompson, 1959)1. An-
other important source for EBF is capital growth theory, or the
theory of growth-optimal investments: Kelly (1956), Breiman
(1961) and Algoet and Cover (1988), and others. For a textbook
presentation of capital growth theory see Evstigneev et al. (2015),
Ch. 17. The EBF models we deal with may be regarded as capital
growth models with endogenous (formed in dynamic equilib-
rium), rather than exogenous (as in the classical theory) asset
prices.
The present paper draws on the previous work of Amir et al.
(2011), where a prototype of the model studied here was devel-
oped and some versions of the results we get in this paper were
obtained. However, that study was conducted under very restric-
tive assumptions (equality of growth rates of the total volumes
of all the assets and equality of investment rates of the market
participants). Relaxing these assumptions required overcoming a
number of conceptual and technical difficulties. Even the form
of the main result on the existence of a survival strategy in the
present, more general, setting differs substantially from that in
Amir et al. (2011). Now this strategy is defined as a solution to
a certain stochastic equation, in contrast with the previous, more
specialized, model where it could be represented in an explicit
form as the sum of a convergent series. For the proof of the
existence and uniqueness of this solution we needed to develop
new mathematical tools related to the ergodic theory of random
dynamical systems: non-stationary stochastic Perron–Frobenius
theorems (for stationary versions of these results see, e.g., Babaei
et al. (2018)).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes
the model. Section 3 states the main results. Section 4 discusses
the EBF modeling approach, its characteristic features and appli-
cations. Section 5 contains some auxiliary propositions needed
for the analysis of the model. Section 6 proves the main re-
sults. Appendix A includes routine proofs of a number of lemmas
formulated in Section 6. Appendix B derives a non-stationary
stochastic version of the Perron–Frobenius theorem used in this
paper.
2. The model
We consider a market where K ≥ 2 assets are traded. The
market is influenced by random factors modeled in terms of an
exogenous stochastic process s1, s2, . . ., where st is a random
element of a measurable space St (‘‘state of the world’’ at date
t). The market opens at date 0 and the assets are traded at all
moments of time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At each date t = 1, 2, . . .
assets k = 1, 2, . . . , K pay dividends Dt,k(s
t ) ≥ 0 depending on
the history st := ( s1, . . . , st ) of states of the world up to date
t . The functions Dt,k(s
t ) (as well as all other functions of st we
will consider) are assumed to be measurable with respect to the





t ) > 0 for all t ≥ 1 and st . (2.1)
1 For a comprehensive discussion of game-theoretic aspects of EBF in a
different but closely related model see Amir et al. (2013), Sections 1 and 6.
This condition means that at each date in each random situation
at least one asset yields a strictly positive dividend. The total
volume (the number of units) of asset k available in the market at
date t ≥ 0 is Vt,k(s
t ) > 0, where Vt,k(s
t ) is a measurable function
of st . For t = 0, the number Vt,k = V0,k > 0 is constant.
We denote by pt ∈ R
K
+ the vector of market prices of the
assets. For each k = 1, . . . , K , the coordinate pt,k of pt =
(pt,1, . . . , pt,K ) stands for the price of one unit of asset k at date
t ≥ 0. There are N ≥ 2 investors (traders) acting in the market.
A portfolio of investor i at date t ≥ 0 is specified by a vector
xit = (x
i
t,1, . . . , x
i




t,k is the amount (the number






t,k expresses the value of the investor i’s portfolio x
i
t at
date t in terms of the prices pt,k. The state of the market at each
date t is characterized by the set of vectors (pt , x
1
t , . . . , x
N
t ), where
pt is the vector of asset prices and x
1
t , . . . , x
N
t are the traders’
portfolios.
At date t = 0 the investors have initial endowments wi0 > 0
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,N), that form their budgets at date 0. Investor i’s
budget at date t ≥ 1 is
wit (s
t ) = ⟨Dt (s




t ) = (Dt,1(s
t ), . . . ,Dt,K (s
t )). It consists of two compo-
nents: the dividends ⟨Dt , x
i
t−1⟩ paid by the portfolio x
i
t−1 and the




t−1 expressed in terms of the prices
pt = (pt,1, . . . , pt,K ) at date t .
For each t ≥ 0, every trader i = 1, 2, . . . ,N selects a vector of
investment proportions λit = (λ
i
t,1, . . . , λ
i
t,K ) according to which i
plans to distribute the available budget between assets. Vectors
λit belong to the unit simplex
∆K := {(a1, . . . , aK ) ≥ 0 : a1 + · · · + aK = 1}.
In terms of the game we are going to describe, the vectors λit
represent the players’ (investors’) actions or control variables. The
investment proportions at each date t ≥ 0 are selected by the N
traders simultaneously and independently, so that we deal here
with a simultaneous-move N-person dynamic game. For t ≥ 1,
players’ actions might depend, generally, on the history st =
(s1, . . . , st ) of the realized states of the world and the history of
the game (pt−1, xt−1, λt−1), where pt−1 = (p0, . . . , pt−1) is the
sequence of asset price vectors up to time t − 1, and
xt−1 := (x0, x1, . . . , xt−1), xl = (x
1
l , . . . , x
N
l ),
λt−1 = (λ0, λ1, . . . , λt−1), λl = (λ
1
l , . . . , λ
N
l ),
are the sets of vectors describing the portfolios and the invest-
ment proportions of all the players at all the dates up to t − 1.
The history of the game contains information about the market
history – the sequence (p0, x0), . . ., (pt−1, xt−1) of the states of the
market – and about the actions λil of all the players (investors)
i = 1, . . . ,N at all the dates l = 0, . . . , t − 1. A vector Λi0 ∈ ∆
K
and a sequence of measurable functions with values in ∆K
Λit (s
t , pt−1, xt−1, λt−1), t = 1, 2, . . .
form an investment (trading) strategy Λi of trader i, specifying
a portfolio rule according to which trader i selects investment
proportions at each date t ≥ 0. This is a general game-theoretic
definition of a strategy, assuming full information about the his-
tory of the game, including the players’ previous actions, and the
knowledge of all the past and present states of the world.
Among general portfolio rules, we will distinguish those for
which Λit depends only on s
t , rather than on the whole market
history (pt−1, xt−1, λt−1). We will call such portfolio rules basic.
They play an important role in the present work: the survival
strategy we are going to construct will belong to this class.
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The essence of the main result (Theorem 2) lies in the fact
that it indicates a relatively simple basic strategy, requiring a
very limited volume of information and guaranteeing survival
in competition with any other strategies which might use all
theoretically possible information.
For each k = 1, . . . , K , a sequence of functions α0,k, α1,k(s
1),
α2,k(s
2), . . . is given characterizing transaction costs for buying
asset k in the market under consideration. It is assumed that
0 < αt,k ≤ 1. If an investor i allocates wealth w
i
t,k to asset k









Suppose that at date 0 each investor i has selected some
investment proportions λi0 = (λ
i
0,1, . . . , λ
i
0,K ) ∈ ∆
K . Then the





is the i’s initial endowment, so that the value of the holding of




0. Thus the value of the







0. It is assumed that the market is always in
equilibrium (asset supply is equal to asset demand), which makes








0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K . (2.2)
On the left-hand side of (2.2) we have the total value p0,kV0,k of
all the assets of the type k in the market (recall that the total
amount of asset k at date 0 is V0,k). The investment proportions
λi0 = (λ
i
0,1, . . . , λ
i
0,K ) chosen by the traders at date 0 determine
their portfolios xi0 = (x
i
0,1, . . . , x
i








, k = 1, 2, . . . , K , i = 1, . . . ,N. (2.3)
Assume now that all the investors have chosen their invest-
ment proportion vectors λit = (λ
i
t,1, . . . , λ
i
t,K ) at date t ≥ 1.






λit,k⟨Dt + pt , x
i
t−1⟩, k = 1, . . . , K . (2.4)
The investment budgets ⟨Dt + pt , x
i
t−1⟩ of the traders
i = 1, 2, . . . ,N are distributed between assets in the proportions
λit,k, so that the kth position of the trader i’s portfolio x
i
t =










, k = 1, . . . , K , i = 1, . . . ,N. (2.5)
Note that the price vector pt is determined implicitly as the
solution to the system of Eqs. (2.4).
Define
γt,k(s
t ) = Vt,k(s
t )/Vt−1,k(s
t−1).
The number γt,k characterizes the speed of growth of the total
volume Vt,k of asset k. It can be shown (see Proposition 1 in
Section 5) that a non-negative vector pt (s
t ) satisfying Eqs. (2.4)
exists and is unique (for any st and any feasible xit−1 and λ
i
t ) as
long as the following condition holds
αt,k(s
t ) < γt,k(s
t ) for all t ≥ 1 and all st . (2.6)
This condition is implied by the basic assumptions under which
the results of this paper are obtained (see Section 4). Note that
if there are no transaction costs, i.e. αt,k = 1, then (2.6) means
that the total volumes of all the assets grow in time at a strictly
positive rate. In another extreme case, when γt,k = 1, i.e. Vt,k
is constant in t , condition (2.6) requires that αt,k < 1, i.e. the
transaction cost rate is non-zero. This property – termed in Math-
ematical Finance ‘‘efficient market friction’’ (see, e.g., Kabanov
and Safarian (2009), p. 117) – plays an important role in various
models with transaction costs, excluding phenomena like the
Saint Petersburg paradox. In our context it is indispensable since
in those cases when this assumption does not hold, a short-run
equilibrium might fail to exist.
Given a strategy profile (Λ1, . . . , ΛN ) of investors and their
initial endowments w10, . . . , w
N
0 , we can generate a path of the
market game by setting
λi0 = Λ
i




t , pt−1, xt−1, λt−1), t = 1, 2, . . . , i = 1, . . . ,N, (2.8)
and by defining pt and x
i
t recursively according to Eqs. (2.2)–(2.5).
The random dynamical system described defines step by step the
vectors of investment proportions λit (s
t ), the equilibrium prices
pt (s
t ) and the investors’ portfolios xit (s
t ) as measurable vector
functions of st for each moment of time t ≥ 0. Thus we obtain a
random path of the game
(pt (s
t ); x1t (s
t ), . . . , xNt (s
t ); λ1t (s
t ), . . . , λNt (s
t )), t ≥ 0, (2.9)





The above description of asset market dynamics requires clar-
ification. Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5) make sense only if pt,k > 0, or
equivalently, if the aggregate demand for each asset (under the
equilibrium prices) is strictly positive. Those strategy profiles
which guarantee that the recursive procedure described above
leads at each step to strictly positive equilibrium prices will
be called admissible. In what follows, we will deal only with
such strategy profiles. The hypothesis of admissibility guarantees
that the random dynamical system under consideration is well-
defined. Under this hypothesis, we obtain by induction that on
the equilibrium path all the portfolios xit = (x
i
t,1, . . . , x
i
t,K ) are
non-zero and the wealth
wit := ⟨Dt + pt , x
i
t−1⟩ (2.10)
of each investor is strictly positive. Further, by summing up

















(the market clears) for every asset k and each date t ≥ 1. The
analogous relations for t = 0 can be obtained by summing
up Eqs. (2.3). Thus for every equilibrium state of the market
(pt , x
1
t , . . . , x
N
t ), we have pt > 0, x
i
t ̸= 0 and (2.11).
We give a simple sufficient condition for a strategy profile to
be admissible. This condition will hold for all the strategy profiles
we shall deal with in the present paper, and in this sense it does
not restrict generality. Suppose that some trader, say trader 1,
uses a portfolio rule that always prescribes to invest into all the
assets in strictly positive proportions λ1t,k. Then a strategy profile
containing this portfolio rule is admissible. Indeed, for t = 0, we






0 > 0 and from (2.3)
that x10 = (x
1
0,1, . . . , x
1
0,K ) > 0 (coordinatewise). Assuming that
x1t−1 > 0 and arguing by induction, we obtain
⟨Dt + pt , x
1
t−1⟩ ≥ ⟨Dt , x
1
t−1⟩ > 0
in view of (2.1), which in turn yields pt > 0 and x
1
t > 0 by virtue
of (2.4) and (2.5), as long as λ1t,k > 0.
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3. The main results
Let (Λ1, . . . , ΛN ) be an admissible strategy profile of the in-
vestors. Consider the path (2.9) of the random dynamical system
generated by this strategy profile and the given initial endow-
ments wi0. We are primarily interested in the long-run behavior
of the relative wealth or the market shares r it := w
i
t/Wt of the





t is the total market wealth. We shall say that a
portfolio rule Λ, or an investor i using it, survives with probability
one if inft≥0 r
i
t > 0 almost surely (a.s.). This means that for almost
all realizations of the process of states of the world s1, s2, . . ., the
market share of investor i using Λ is bounded away from zero by
a strictly positive random variable.
Definition. Let us say that a portfolio rule Λ is a survival strategy
if any investor using it survives with probability one irrespective
of what portfolio rules are used by the other investors.
We will construct a strategy Λ∗ which, as we shall prove, will







, t ≥ 1, k = 1, . . . , K .










k = 1, . . . , K , t ≥ 1, (3.1)
and put Rt (s
t ) := (Rt,1(s
t ), . . . , Rt,K (s
t )). The strategy Λ∗ =
(λ∗t (s




t,1, . . . , λ
∗
t,K ), is defined as the basic
strategy satisfying the equation
Et [ρt+1,kλ
∗







= λ∗t,k (a.s.), k = 1, . . . , K . (3.2)
Here Et (·) = E(·|s
t ) stands for the conditional expectation given
st . We will provide conditions under which the strategy Λ∗ exists
and is unique up to stochastic equivalence, i.e. if Λ = (λt (s
t ))t≥0
is another solution to (3.2), then λ∗t = λt (a.s.) for all t .
Throughout the paper we will assume that the following con-
ditions hold:
(A.1) There exist constants υ > 0 and l ≥ 0 such that for each
t and k, we have
max
1≤m≤l
Rt+m,k ≥ υ. (3.3)
(A.2) There exist strictly positive constants κ and α such that
for all k, t
α ≤ ρt,k ≤ 1 − κ. (3.4)
Theorem 1. Under assumptions (A.1) and (A.2), a solution (λ∗t )t≥0
to Eq. (3.2) exists and is unique up to stochastic equivalence. There
exists a constant δ > 0 such that λ∗t,k ≥ δ.
For a proof of Theorem 1 see Appendix B, Theorem B.2.
Let us discuss the meaning of Eq. (3.2). Suppose for the mo-
ment that the growth rates of all the assets are the same, so that
ρt,1 = ρt,2 = · · · = ρt,K = ρt . (3.5)
In this case, Eq. (3.2) takes on the following form
Et [ρt+1λ
∗
t+1,k + (1 − ρt+1)Rt+1,k] = λ
∗
t,k (a.s.), (3.6)
and it admits an explicit solution. The kth coordinate λ∗t,k of the
vector λ∗t can be represented as the conditional expectation of the









1 − ρt+l , if l = 1,
ρt+1ρt+2....ρt+l−1(1 − ρt+l), if l > 1.
(3.8)




ρ lt = (1 − ρt+1) + ρt+1(1 − ρt+2) + ρt+1ρt+2(1 − ρt+3) + · · ·
converges uniformly, and its sum is equal to one. Therefore




tRt+l,k in (3.7) converges
uniformly to a random vector belonging the unit simplex ∆K ,
so that the right-hand side of (3.7) is well-defined. The proof
of Eq. (3.7) will be given in Proposition 5.






[(1 − ρ)ρ l−1Rt+l,k]. (3.9)
Further, if the random elements st are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) and the relative dividends Rt,k(s
t ) = Rk(st )
depend only on the current state st and do not explicitly depend
on t , then EtRk(st+l) = ERk(st ) (l ≥ 1), and so
λ∗t,k = ERk(st ), (3.10)
which means that the strategy Λ∗ is formed by the sequence of
vectors (ER1(st ), . . . , ERK (st )) (constant and independent of t and
st ). Note that in this special case, the formula (3.10) for Λ∗ does
not involve the factor ρ.
Formulas (3.7), (3.9) and (3.10) reflect two general principles
in Financial Economics:
(a) The strategy Λ∗ prescribes the allocation of wealth among
assets in the proportions of their fundamental values—the expec-
tations of the future relative (discounted, weighted) dividends.
(b) The portfolio rule Λ∗ defined in terms of the relative
dividends provides an investment recommendation in line with
the CAPM principles, emphasizing the role of the market portfolio
(see, e.g., Evstigneev et al., 2015, Chapter 7).
In this connection it should be emphasized that instead of the
traditional weighing assets according to their prices, the weights
in the definition of Λ∗ are based on fundamentals, so that Λ∗ is
an example of fundamental indexing (Arnott et al., 2008).
As we have already noted, EBF can be viewed as an extension
of the classical capital growth theory (Kelly, 1956; Breiman, 1961;
Algoet and Cover, 1988, and others) to the case of endogenous
asset prices and returns. In the classical setting, a central role is
played by the famous Kelly portfolio rule (Kelly, 1956) guarantee-
ing the fastest asymptotic growth rate of wealth in the long run.
The Kelly rule is obtained by the maximization of the expected
logarithm of the portfolio return. It can be shown (see the next
section) that in the present model survival is equivalent to the
fasted relative growth of wealth in the long run. Therefore Λ∗
may be viewed as a counterpart of the Kelly portfolio rule in the
present model. However, in the game-theoretic model at hand,
where the performance of a strategy depends not only on the
strategy itself but on the whole strategy profile, Λ∗ cannot be
obtained as a solution to a single-agent optimization problem
with a logarithmic or any other objective functional.
It should be noted that in the case of different ρt,k, when
condition (3.5) does not hold, we cannot provide an explicit
124
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formula, like (3.7), for the strategy Λ∗. However, we can suggest
an algorithm for computing Λ∗ converging at an exponential rate.
This algorithm is actually contained in the proof of the existence
and uniqueness of a solution to Eq. (3.2), see Appendix B, formulas
(B.9) and (B.10).
The main results of the paper are formulated in Theorems 2
and 3.
Theorem 2. The portfolio rule Λ∗ is a survival strategy.
As we have already noted, the portfolio rule Λ∗ belongs to the
class of basic portfolio rules: the investment proportions λ∗t (s
t )
depend only on the history st of the process of states of the world
and do not depend on the market history.
Note that the class of basic strategies is sufficient in the follow-
ing sense. Any sequence of vectors rt = (r
1
t , . . . , r
N
t ) (rt = rt (s
t ))
of market shares generated by some strategy profile (Λ1, . . . , ΛN )
can be generated by a strategy profile (λ1t (s
t ), . . . , λNt (s
t )) consist-
ing of basic portfolio rules. The corresponding vector functions
λit (s
t ) can be defined recursively by (2.7) and (2.8), using (2.2)–
(2.5). Thus it is sufficient to prove Theorem 2 only for basic port-
folio rules; this will imply that the portfolio rule (3.7) survives in
competition with any, not necessarily basic, strategies.
The following result shows that the survival portfolio rule Λ∗
is unique in the class of all basic strategies.






2 < ∞ (a.s.).
It is not known whether this result remains valid for the
class of general, not necessarily basic, strategies. This question
remains open; it indicates an interesting direction for further
research. Some examples pertaining to a different, but closely
related, model might suggest a conjecture that the answer to this
question is negative (see Amir et al., 2013, Section 5).
Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are given in the remainder of the
paper.
4. Discussion
In this section we discuss the EBF approach, the model under
consideration and the results obtained.
1. Marshallian temporary equilibrium. In the general
methodological perspective, the modeling framework at hand re-
lies upon the Marshallian (Marshall, 1949) principle of temporary
equilibrium. The dynamics of the asset market in this framework
are similar to the dynamics of the commodity market as outlined
in the classical treatise by Marshall (1949) (Book V, Chapter
II “Temporary Equilibrium of Demand and Supply”). The ideas
of Marshall were developed in the framework of mathematical
economics by Samuelson (1947). As it was noticed by Samuelson
and discussed in detail by Schlicht (1985), in order to study the
process of market dynamics by using the Marshallian “moving
equilibrium method,” one needs to distinguish between at least
two sets of economic variables changing with different speeds.
Then the set of variables changing slower (in our case, the set
xt = (x
1
t , . . . ., x
N
t ) of investors’ portfolios) can be temporarily
fixed, while the other (in our case, the asset prices pt ) can be
assumed to rapidly reach the unique state of partial equilibrium.
Samuelson (1947), pp. 321–323, writes about this approach:
I, myself, find it convenient to visualize equilib-
rium processes of quite different speed, some very
slow compared to others. Within each long run there
is a shorter run, and within each shorter run there is
a still shorter run, and so forth in an infinite regres-
sion. For analytic purposes it is often convenient to
treat slow processes as data and concentrate upon
the processes of interest. For example, in a short
run study of the level of investment, income, and
employment, it is often convenient to assume that
the stock of capital is perfectly or sensibly fixed.
As it follows from the above citation, Samuelson thinks about a
hierarchy of various equilibrium processes with different speeds.
In our model, it is sufficient to deal with only two levels of
such a hierarchy. We leave the price adjustment process leading
to the solution of the partial equilibrium problem (2.4) beyond
the scope of the model. It can be shown, however, that this
equilibrium will be reached at an exponential rate in the course
of a naturally defined tâtonnement procedure. This can be demon-
strated by using the contraction property of the operator (5.1)
involved in the equilibrium pricing equation (2.4). Our framework
makes it possible to admit a whole spectrum of mechanisms
leading to an equilibrium in the short run. In reality, various
auction-type mechanisms are used for the purpose of equilibrat-
ing bids and offers, resulting in market clearing. An analysis of
several types of such mechanisms and their implications for the
structure of trading in financial markets has been performed by
Bottazzi et al. (2005).
A rigorous mathematical treatment of the above multiscale
approach, involving “rapid” and “slow” variables, is provided
within continuous-time settings in the theory of singular pertur-
bations, see e.g. Smith (1985) and Kevorkian and Cole (1996). In
connection with economic modeling, questions of this kind are
considered in detail in the monograph by Schlicht (1985). The
equations on pp. 29–30 in Schlicht (1985) are direct continuous-
time (deterministic) counterparts of our Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5).
The term ‘‘temporary equilibrium’’ was apparently coined for
the first time by Marshall. However, in the last decades this term
has been associated basically with a different, non-Marshallian
notion, going back to Lindahl (1939) and Hicks (1946). This notion
was developed in formal settings by Grandmont, Hildenbrand
and others, see Grandmont (1988, 1977) and Grandmont and
Hildenbrand (1974). The characteristic feature of the Lindahl–
Hicks temporary equilibrium is the idea of forecasts or beliefs
about the future states of the world, which the market partic-
ipants possess and which are formalized in terms of stochastic
kernels (transition functions) conditioning the distributions of
future states of the world upon the agents’ private information. A
comprehensive discussion of this direction of research is provided
by Magill and Quinzii (2003). In this work, we pursue a com-
pletely different approach. Our model might indirectly take into
account agents’ forecasts or beliefs, but they can be only implicitly
reflected in the agents’ investment strategies. We do not need to
model in formal terms how the market players form, update and
use these beliefs in their investment decisions.
For further comments on the comparison of the financial DSGE
models based on the traditional Walrasian paradigm and those
relying upon the EBF approach, see Amir et al. (2020), Section 7.
2. In order to survive you have to win! One might think
that the focus on survival substantially restricts the scope of the
analysis, since ‘‘one should care about survival only if things go
wrong’’. It turns out, however, that the class of survival strategies
in most of the EBF models coincides with the class of unbeatable
strategies performing in the long run not worse in terms of
wealth accumulation than any other strategies competing in the
market. To demonstrate this let us reformulate the notion of
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a survival strategy in terms of the wealth processes wit of the
market players i = 1, 2, . . . ,N . Survival of a portfolio rule Λ1




t , where c is a strictly
positive random variable. The last inequality holds if and only if
wit ≤ Cw
1
t , i = 1, . . . ,N, (4.1)
where C is some random variable. Property (4.1) expresses the
fact that the wealth of any player i using any strategy Λi cannot
grow asymptotically faster than the wealth of player 1 who uses
the strategy Λ1. If this is the case, the portfolio rule Λ1 is called
unbeatable. Thus survival strategies are those and only those that
are unbeatable: in order to survive, you have to win!
For a general definition and discussion of the notion of an
unbeatable strategy as a game solution concept see Amir et al.
(2013), Section 6.
3. Evolutionary portfolio theory. One of the sources of mo-
tivation for EBF has always been related to quantitative applica-
tions of the results to portfolio selection problems. The data of
EBF models needed for quantitative financial analysis are essen-
tially the same as those needed for the applications of the theory
of derivative securities pricing (e.g. the Black–Scholes formula)
in Mathematical Finance/Financial Engineering. They do not need
the knowledge, or the algorithms for revealing, hidden agents’
characteristics such as their utilities and beliefs. The model and
the results are described in operational terms and require only
statistical estimates of objectively observable asset data.
A crucial role in the applications of EBF to portfolio selection is
played by the discovery of investment factors that deliver returns
in excess of the market. For example, Basu (1977) found the so-
called value factor, according to which investing into equities
with a high book-to-market ratio delivers higher returns than
the market. Banz (1981) found that the same is true if one
invests into equities with small market capitalization. Carhart
(1997) found the momentum factor according to which investing
in equities that have recently gone up delivers excess returns.
Moreover even though by now hundreds of investment factors
have been proposed, Harvey et al. (2016) have shown that only
a few factors are needed to understand the dynamics of equity
returns. The current state of these discoveries is summarized in
the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. According to these
empirical results, the return of every portfolio selection strategy
can be decomposed into its allocation to a few investment factors.
Thus, it is natural to model the dynamics of equity markets by
modeling the dynamic interaction of those investment factors.
And this is what EBF is perfectly suited for. In the EBF framework,
an investment factor defines a strategy determining the corre-
sponding investment proportions. Note that investment factors
are not based on individuals’ utility functions and subjective
probabilities! EBF can then be used to compute what impact the
increase in relative wealth corresponding to one factor has on
any other factor. In particular, the impact of a factor on itself
gives a model-based measure of the capacity of the factor. This
is very practical information since investors should avoid being
stuck in crowded strategies. Also, when a certain investment
factor gets fashionable this has cross impacts on other factors
that one can compute based on the EBF model. For example, in
recent years investing according to ESG (Environmental, Social,
and Corporate Governance) criteria has become fashionable, and
the EBF approach shows that this has a strong negative impact
on the momentum factor. Finally, based on this approach one can
compute the dynamics of the relative wealth, so that one can use
the EBF model to determine which investment factors survive in
the long run. A first paper systematically developing these ideas
and opening up a new realm of fruitful applications of EBF to
portfolio selection problems has recently been published in the
Journal of Portfolio Management (Hens et al., 2020).
5. Auxiliary propositions
In this section we prove several auxiliary propositions needed
for the analysis of the model at hand. The first proposition estab-
lishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price vector
at each date t ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. Let assumption (2.6) hold. Let xt−1 = (x
1
t−1, . . . ,




+ satisfying (2.11). Then for any s
t
there exists a unique solution pt ∈ R
K
+ to Eqs. (2.4). This solution is
measurable with respect to all the parameters involved in (2.4).
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix some t and st and consider the
operator transforming a vector p = (p1, . . . , pK ) ∈ R
K
+ into the









λit,k⟨Dt + p, x
i
t−1⟩. (5.1)
This operator is contracting in the norm ∥p∥V :=
∑
k |pk|Vt−1,k.





t,k } < 1,
and so





























































= β∥p − p′∥V ,
where the last but one equality follows from (2.11). By using the
contraction principle, we obtain the existence, uniqueness and
measurability of the solution to (2.4). □
In the next proposition, we derive a system of equations gov-
erning the dynamics of the market shares of the investors given
their admissible strategy profile (Λ1, . . . , ΛN ). Consider the path
(2.9) of the random dynamical system generated by (Λ1, . . . , ΛN )
and the sequence of vectors rt = (r
1
t , . . . , r
N
t ), where r
i
t is the
investor i’s market share at date t .











i = 1, . . . ,N, t ≥ 0.
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where t ≥ 1, wt := (w
1
t , . . . , w
N
t ) and λt,k := (λ
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where, we recall, ρt+1,k = αt+1,kVt,k/Vt+1,k. □
Consider the model with two traders (N = 2) using strategies
Λi = (λit,k(s









Recall that the relative dividends Rt,k(s
t ) of the assets k = 1, . . . , K
are defined by (3.1), and Rt (s
t ) denotes the vector (Rt,1(s
t ), . . . ,
Rt,K (s
t )). Further, let us define for i = 1, 2,




































(t = 0, 1, . . .). (5.4)
Proof of Proposition 3. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}, j ̸= i. By



































































By using the definition of the relative dividends Rt+1,k, we can














































































































































and consequently, the expression in the parentheses in Eq. (5.7)












































































































which completes the proof. □
The next proposition shows that it is sufficient to consider the
case when N = 2, i.e., the general model can be reduced to the
case of two investors.
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Proposition 4. In the model with two investors i = 1, 2 using the
strategies Λ and Λ̃, respectively, the wealth w1t of the first player
coincides with the wealth w1t of the first player in the original model,
and the wealth w̃2t of the second ‘‘aggregate’’ investor coincides with
the total wealth w2t + · · · + w
N
t of the group of N − 1 investors
i = 2, . . . ,N in the original model.
Proof of Proposition 4. Define
w̃2t = w
2



















w2t + · · · + w
N
t




which means that the vector λ̃2t := (λ̃
2
t,1, . . . , λ̃
2
t,K ) belongs to
the unit simplex ∆K . Let us regard λ̃2t = (λ̃
2
t,1, . . . , λ̃
2
t,K ) as
the vector of investment proportions of an ‘‘aggregate investor’’,
whose wealth is w̃2t = w
2
t + · · · + w
N





































Recall that the dynamics of wealth of N investors is governed by











i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
(see (5.2)). By summing up these equations over i = 2, 3, . . . ,N



















































which completes the proof. □
Proposition 5. Under assumption (3.5), the portfolio rule Λ∗ =
(λ∗t,k) can be computed by formula (3.7).





































ρ l+1t Rt+l+1,k + ρ
1




ρ ltRt+l,k = λ
∗
t,k
because 1 − ρt+1 = ρ
1
t and
ρ l+1t = ρt+1ρt+2....ρt+l(1 − ρt+l+1) = ρt+1ρ
l
t+1
for l ≥ 1. □
6. Proofs of the main results
In this section, proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are given. The
plan of the proofs is as follows. Proposition 4 shows that we can
consider, without loss of generality, the case of two investors.
This reduces the dimension of the original random dynamical
system from a general N to N = 2. Proposition 3 describes a one-
dimensional system which governs the evolution of the ratio xt =
r1t /r
2
t of the market shares of the two investors, and thus reduces
the dimension of the problem to 1. Our goal is to show that the
random sequence (xt ) defined recursively by (5.4) is bounded
away from zero almost surely. To this end it turns out to be
convenient to take a “step back” and to increase the dimension to
K (the number of assets). Assuming that the first trader uses the
investment proportions λ1t,k = λ
∗
t,k(s
t ) prescribed by the portfolio
rule Λ∗ and the second trader employs investment proportions
λ2t,k = λt,k(s
t ) specified by some other portfolio rule Λ, we
introduce the following change of variables
ykt = λt,k/xt , k = 1, . . . , K , (6.1)
and define yt := (y
1
t , . . . , y
K
t ). We examine the dynamics of
the random vectors yt = yt (s
t ) implied by the system (5.4).




t | of the vector yt ≥ 0 is equal to
∑
k(λt,k/xt ) = 1/xt , and what we need is to show that 1/|yt |
is bounded away from zero (a.s.). To prove this, we construct a
stochastic Lyapunov function—a function of yt which forms a non-
negative supermartingale (ζt ) along a path (yt ) of the system at
hand (see Lemma 3). By using the supermartingale convergence
theorem, we prove that the stochastic process ζt converges (a.s.),
which implies that it is bounded (a.s.). We complete the proof
of Theorem 2 by showing that the boundedness of ζt implies
that xt = 1/|yt | is bounded away from zero. By using the above
techniques, together with some additional considerations, we
complete this section with a proof of Theorem 3.
We begin the realization of the plan outlined with two lemmas
containing inequalities involving the variables ykt defined by (6.1).
Define the non-negative random variables
Yt := ln(1 + |yt |) = − ln r
1
t , (6.2)





























Later in the proofs, the following two equalities will be em-
ployed:
ln γ t+1k,m = Zt+1,m − Zt,k (6.5)
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γ t+1k,m − 1
)
. (6.6)
The algebraic identity (6.6) can be checked quite easily, and we
leave its proof to the reader. In particular, if m = k then (6.6)













γ t+1k,k − 1
)
.
Proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are based on Lemmas 1–4 which
we formulate below and prove in Appendix A.
Let us define a function
f (x) =
(x − 1) ln x
x + 2
, (6.7)
which will be helpful in estimating some logarithmic expressions.
Lemma 1. The function f (x) is non-negative, has a unique root x = 1
and satisfies
x − 1 ≥ ln x + f (x), x ∈ (−∞, +∞). (6.8)

















































Lemma 3. The sequence of random variables ζt (t ≥ 1) is a
non-negative supermartingale, and we have













≥ 0 (a.s.). (6.11)
Lemma 4. Let ζt be a supermartingale such that inft Eζt > −∞.




In what follows, in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 as well
as Lemmas 1–4, we will sometimes omit "a.s.’’ where it does not
lead to ambiguity.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 4, the sequence ζt defined in
(6.10) is a non-negative supermartingale. Therefore it converges
(a.s.), and hence it is bounded above (a.s.) by some random
constant C:


































Here, we used the non-negativity of the function f established




Recall that by virtue of Theorem 1, λ∗t,k ≥ δ for any t, k.
Therefore C/δ ≥ ln
(






for all t, k, and there exists





t, k. Furthermore, there exists some k such that λt,k ≥ 1/K (since
∑K
k=1 λt,k = 1). For this k the following inequality holds:














(1 − r1t )
r1t K
,
which implies r1t ≥ (K (H − 1) + 1)
−1 = τ . □
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of this theorem consists in several
steps. We outline these steps here and provide details of the
arguments in Appendix A.













2 < ∞. (6.12)

































































































for each m. This fact will be used at the next step.



















































































































where φ > 0 is a random variable such that r2t /r
1
t ≥ φ, which
exists because Λ = (λt ) is a survival strategy. □
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. We first observe that for 0 < x ≤ 1 we have
2(x − 1)(x + 1)−1 ≥ ln x. Hence
(x − 1) ≥
(x + 1) ln x
2
≥ ln x +
(x − 1) ln x
x + 2
= ln x + f (x). (A.1)
On the other hand, for x ≥ 1 we have (x − 1)(x + 1)/(2x) ≥ ln x.
Therefore
x − 1 ≥
2x
x + 1
ln x ≥ ln x +
(x − 1) ln x
x + 2
= ln x + f (x). (A.2)
By combining (A.1) and (A.2) we obtain (6.8). Clearly f (x) is non-
negative and if x ̸= 1, then f (x) = (x− 1) ln x/(x+ 2) ̸= 0, and so
if x ̸= 1, then f (x) > 0. □
Proof of Lemma 2. From formula (5.4) and (5.3) with λ1t,k = λ
∗
t,k








































By using the notation ykt = λt,k/xt and the fact that |yt | = 1/xt ,











































































γ t+1k,m − 1
)
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γ t+1k,m − 1
)
= 0. (A.4)
The first sum in (A.4) can be estimated by using the well-
known inequality γ t+1k,k − 1 ≥ ln γ
t+1
k,k . To estimate the second
sum let us employ Lemma 1: γ t+1k,m − 1 ≥ ln γ
t+1























k,m + f (γ
t+1
k,m )) ≤ 0.















t+1,m(Zt+1,m − Zt,k + f (γ
t+1































This inequality obtained is nothing but the one in (6.9), which
completes the proof. □
Proof of Lemma 3. By virtue of Lemma 1, the function f is














This implies that ζt ≥ 0. By taking the conditional expectation


















































where the last equality follows from the definition of λ∗t,k. By
using (A.5) and (A.6), we find
































= ζt . (A.7)
To complete the proof that ζt is a supermartingale it is suffi-
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is bounded. To this end we notice that

















because λ∗1,k ≥ δ (see Theorem 1). Now it remains only to show
that r11 is bounded away from zero by a strictly positive constant.
























Since r20 is a strictly positive constant, it is sufficient to show that
the nominator of the above fraction, which we denote by A, is
bounded away from zero and the denominator, denoted by B, is



















) ≥ κδ/(K (δx0 + 1)) =: A.
The second inequality holds because U1 ≥ κ by the definition of
Ui (see (5.3)) and assumption (A.2). The third inequality is valid
since there exists k such that R1,k ≥ 1/K (because
∑K
k=1 R1,k = 1)
and the whole sum is not less than one summand. It remains only













1Ax0/B = (1 − r
1
1 )Ax0/B ≥ (1 − r
1
1 )Ax0, which




. Thus, r11 is bounded away from zero,
therefore Z1,k and γ
1





and hence the boundedness of ζ1. The
proof is complete. □
Proof of Lemma 4. The random variables ηt := ζt − Etζt+1 are









(Eζt − Eζt+1) = Eζ0 − EζT ,
and so the sequence
∑T−1
t=0 E ηt is bounded because supT (−EζT ) =
− infT E ζT < +∞. Therefore the series of the expectations
∑∞
t=0 E ηt of the non-negative random variables ηt converges,
which implies
∑∞





ηt (the last equality holds for any sequence ηt ≥ 0). The proof is
complete. □
The remainder of the Appendix provides details of the proof
of Theorem 3 (steps 1 to 4).
1st step. Since investor 1 uses the strategy Λ∗, by virtue of
Lemma 3 the sequence ζt defined by (6.10) is a non-negative


















By assumption (A.2), we have (1 − ρt,m) ≥ ̹ > 0, and since














< ∞ (a.s.). (A.9)














2 < ∞ (a.s.). (A.10)
To this end it is sufficient to verify that for some random variable
















≥ θ > 0.









(γ tk,m − 1) ln γ
t
k,m
(γ tk,m − 1)
2(γ tk,m + 2)
≤ Gt .
Note that the function ln x(x−1)−1(x+2)−1 is non-increasing and




















where the last inequality holds by virtue of Theorem 2 and
because λ∗t,m ≥ δ. Since γ
t









(M − 1)(M + 2)
.
Thus we have proved that the series (A.10) converges.
2nd step. Using (6.6) we can see that the following inequality
holds:









































































for any k,m. Now recall that
∑K
k=1 Rt,k = 1 and hence for all t
there exists at least one k such that Rt,k ≥ 1/K . Denote this k by





































)2 < ∞. (A.13)

























































































































)2 converge (see (A.13)), then















































4th step. Consider two cases: (i) λt,m/λ
∗
t,m ≥ 1 and
(ii) λt,m/λ
∗
t,m ≤ 1. In the first case, among the K − 1 fractions
λt,k/λ
∗











m) and λt,m ≥ λ
∗







which is a contradiction. By the same argument, we can show
in the second case that if λt,m/λ
∗






Thus, we have proved that for each m there exists m′ such that
either λt,m/λ
∗




















































The purpose of this Appendix is to prove Theorem B.2, which
implies the existence and uniqueness of the Λ∗ strategy playing
a central role in this work (see the definition in Section 3). We
will deduce Theorem B.2 from Theorem B.1, which represents a
non-stationary version of the stochastic Perron–Frobenius the-
orem, see Babaei et al. (2018) and references therein. In turn,
Theorem B.1 will be obtained as a consequence of a chain of aux-
iliary results formulated in Lemmas B.1–B.2 and Propositions B.1–
B.3 below.
Denote by Mn (n > 1) the set of n×n matrices B ≥ 0 such that
Bx ̸= 0 for all x ∈ Q := {x : 0 ̸= x ≥ 0}. For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn,




Let φ(B) denote the ratio of the smallest and the greatest elements
of the matrix B.
Lemma B.1. Let B1, B2, . . . , Bk ∈ M






−2φ(Bi)φ(Bi+1), δi = (1 − 2ρi).
For a proof of this result see Evstigneev (1974), Lemma 1.
Put ∆ = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) : xj ≥ 0,
∑
xj = 1}. Let D
n denote
the set of matrices B in Mn representing linear transformations
of Rn that map ∆ into itself. For δ > 0 we will denote by Dnδ the
set of matrices B ∈ Dn whose elements are not less than δ.





where M = n2δ−2 and ρ = 1 − n−2δ2.
Proof. This is immediate from (B.1) because





δi = 1 − 2ρi ≤ 1 − n
−2δ2 = ρ. □
Let B1, B2, . . . be a sequence of matrices in D
n.






t+1, t ≥ 0. (B.3)
Proof. Put ∆∞ = ∆ × ∆ × · · · and Y = Rn × Rn × · · ·. Let us in-
troduce in Y the product topology: (ymt )t≥0 → (yt )t≥0 if and only
if ymt → yt for all t . Then Y is a topological locally convex vector
space and ∆∞ is a compact convex set in Y . Consider the mapping
B : Y → Y transforming (yt )t≥0 into (Bt+1yt+1)t≥0. This mapping
is continuous and transforms ∆∞ into itself. Consequently, by the
Schauder–Tychonoff theorem (e.g. Zeidler, 1986) it has a fixed
point y∗ = By∗, which proves the proposition. □
For each t ≥ 1 and j ≥ 0 denote B
t+j
t = Bt ...Bt+j. For any
y = (yt ) ∈ ∆
∞ denote by Bmt (y) the tth term of the sequence
B
m(y) ∈ ∆∞, where Bm(y) is the mth iterate of the mapping B.
Clearly, if we put ymt = B
m
t (y) (t ≥ 0), then





t+1 = Bt+1Bt+2yt+2 = B
t+2
t+1yt+2, . . . ,
ymt = Bt+1Bt+2...Bt+myt+m = B
t+m
t+1 yt+m, t ≥ 0.
Proposition B.2. Suppose there exist an integer l ≥ 0 and a real
number δ > 0 such that for any t ≥ 1 the matrix Bt+lt belongs to
D
n
δ . Then the solution y
∗ = (y∗t )t≥0 to Eq. (B.3) is unique, and for
every t ≥ 0, the sequence ymt = B
m




Proof. Uniqueness follows from convergence. To prove the uni-
form convergence of ymt we estimate the distance between y
m
t and
y∗t by using (B.2). Define
Hj = B
t+jl+j
t+(j−1)l+j, j ≥ 1.
For m ≥ l + 1 denote by k = k(m) the greatest natural number
such that kl + k ≤ m and put
C t+mt =
{
Bt+mt+kl+k+1, kl + k < m






























t+1 yt+m = H1...HkC
t+m
t yt+m.
Thus, in view of (B.2),
|y∗t − y
m
t | ≤ Mρ
k−1
because Hj ∈ D
n




t (y) → y
∗
t uniformly in y,
since k = k(m) → ∞ as m → ∞. □
Suppose that the matrices Bt = Bt (ω) ∈ D
n are random,
i.e., Bt (ω) for each t = 1, 2, . . . is a measurable matrix function on
the probability space (Ω,F, P). Assume the following condition
holds:
(B) For some l ≥ 0 and δ > 0, the matrix Bt+lt (ω) belongs to
D
n
δ a.s. for all t ≥ 1.
Proposition B.3. Under assumption (B), there exists a sequence
(y∗t )t≥0 of measurable vector functions y
∗






t , t ≥ 0 (a.s.). (B.4)
The solution (y∗t )t≥0 to Eq. (B.4) is unique, and we have y
∗
t (ω) ≥ δe
(a.s.). There exists a set Ω1 ∈ F with P(Ω1) = 1 such that for every
t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ Ω1 the sequence y
m
t (ω) = B
m
t (y)(ω) converges to
y∗t (ω) uniformly in y ∈ ∆
∞.
The uniqueness is understood in terms of stochastic equiv-
alence: if (y∗∗t (ω))t≥0 is another such sequence, then y
∗∗
t (ω) =
y∗t (ω) (a.s.) for all t .
Proof of Proposition B.3. By assumption, there exists a set Ω1 ∈
F of full measure such that for ω ∈ Ω1 the matrix B
t+l
t (ω) ∈ D
n
δ
for all t ≥ 1. Take any ω ∈ Ω1 and apply Proposition B.2. We
obtain that there exists a sequence of vector functions y∗t (ω) with
values in ∆ satisfying (B.3) for ω ∈ Ω1. Fix some d ∈ ∆ and
define y∗t (ω) as d for ω ∈ Ω\Ω1. Then (B.4) will hold almost
surely. Observe that the functions y∗t (ω) are measurable because
according to Proposition B.2 (applied to y := (d, d, . . .) ∈ ∆∞),
we have
y∗t (ω) = lim
m→∞
Bt+mt+1 (ω)d for ω ∈ Ω1.
To prove uniqueness suppose there is another sequence ŷ =
(ŷt (ω))t≥0 satisfying (B.4) almost surely. Then by virtue of
Proposition B.2, Bmt (ŷ)(ω) → y
∗
t (ω) for ω ∈ Ω1. On the other
hand, Bmt (ŷ)(ω) = ŷt (ω) (a.s.), and so y
∗
t (ω) = ŷt (ω) (a.s.).
Finally, y∗t (ω) ≥ δe (a.s.) because y
∗





where y∗t+l+1(ω) ∈ ∆ and B
t+l+1
t+1 (ω) ∈ D
n
δ (a.s.). □
Let A1(ω), A2(ω), . . . be a sequence of random matrices. Con-
sider the following condition:
(A) For each t ≥ 1, the matrix At (ω) depends Ft-measurably
on ω, and there exist l ≥ 0 and δ > 0, such that the matrix
At+lt (ω) := At (ω)...At+l(ω) belongs to D
n
δ a.s. for all t ≥ 1.
Theorem B.1. Under assumption (A), there exists a sequence








t (a.s.), t ≥ 0. (B.5)
This sequence is unique up to stochastic equivalence, and we have
x∗t ≥ δe (a.s.). (B.6)
Proof. Fix any (non-random) matrix B1 ∈ Dnδ and define
B1 = B
1, Bt := At−1, t ≥ 2. (B.7)
By applying Proposition B.3 to the sequence of matrices (Bt )t≥1
defined by (B.7), we obtain that there exists a sequence y∗t (ω),









t+1, t ≥ 0.


















and so the sequence (x∗t )t≥0 satisfies (B.5).
Suppose there is another sequence (x̂t )t≥0 satisfying EtAt+1x̂t+1
= x̂t (a.s.) for all t ≥ 0. Then we have
x̂t = EtAt+1x̂t+1 = EtAt+1Et+1At+2x̂t+2
= EtEt+1At+1At+2x̂t+2 = EtAt+1At+2x̂t+2 (a.s.).
Continuing this process, we get
x̂t = EtAt+1...At+mx̂t+m = EtA
t+m
t+1 x̂t+m (a.s.). (B.9)











and so x̂t = x
∗
t (a.s.). □
We conclude this Appendix by formulating and proving
Theorem B.2—the result on the existence and uniqueness of the
Λ∗ strategy in the model studied in the present paper. Let (ρt )t≥1
be a sequence of Ft-measurable random vectors ρt = (ρt,1, . . . ,
ρt,n) such that 0 ≤ ρt,i ≤ 1, and (Rt )t≥1 a sequence of Ft-






Recall that Λ∗ was defined as the solution to Eq. (3.2). To prove
that this solution exists and is unique let us define for each t ≥ 0
the linear operator At+1:














This operator transforms ∆ into itself, and for x ∈ ∆ we have





Consequently, Eq. (3.2) can be written in the form (B.5) (with
obvious changes in notation).
Let us introduce the following condition.
(R) There exist constants γ > 0 and l ≥ 0 such that for each
t and i, we have
max
1≤m≤l
Rt+m,i ≥ γ . (B.11)
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Theorem B.2. Suppose that condition (R) holds and there exists a
constant θ > 0 such that min{ρt,i, 1 − ρt+1,i} ≥ θ for all t and i.
Then a solution (x∗t )t≥0to Eq. (B.5) exists, is unique up to stochastic
equivalence, and satisfies (B.6) for some δ > 0.
Proof. Take any x ∈ ∆ and define recursively xt+1 = At+1x, and
xt+m+1 = At+m+1xt+m. Then we have









l−1Rt+2,i + · · · + θRt+l,i




Thus condition (A) holds with δ := θ lγ , and so Theorem B.2
follows from Theorem B.1. □
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